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Abstract
In the ecumenical dialogue of the Christian Churches (both Catholic and Evangelical), the 
issue of the development of populist tendencies is the subject of research, debate and joint 
statements by their most prominent representatives. This joint voice shows, on the one 
hand, the genesis and directions of the spread of populist ideas, pointing out all dangers 
for the development of civil society, and on the other hand, it highlights the weaknesses 
of the democratic system in the face of all abuses consisting in the concentration of capi-
tal and disturbing social justice, reducing the participation of citizens in decision-making 
processes and, in the case of the European Union, the development of federalist visions to 
the detriment of the community of homelands dominated by more developed economic and 
financial countries.
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Ocena tendencji populistycznych 
 w debacie Kościołów chrześcijańskich w Niemczech
Perspektywa teologicznomoralna
Abstrakt
W dialogu ekumenicznym Kościołów chrześcijańskich (katolickim i ewangelickim) 
kwestia rozwoju tendencji populistycznych jest przedmiotem badań, debat i wspólnych 
oświadczeń ich najważniejszych przedstawicieli. Ten wspólny głos pokazuje z jednej stro-
ny genezę i kierunki rozprzestrzeniania się idei populistycznych, wskazując na wszelkie 
niebezpieczeństwa dla rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, z drugiej zaś strony uwy-
datnia słabości systemu demokratycznego wobec wszelkich nadużyć, polegających na 
koncentracji kapitału i zachwiania sprawiedliwości społecznej, pomniejszania partycypacji 
obywateli w procesach decyzyjnych oraz rozwijania, w przypadku Unii Europejskiej, wizji 
federalistycznych na niekorzyść wspólnoty ojczyzn z dominacją państw mocniej rozwinię-
tych ekonomicznie-finansowo.
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ność.
Public debate concerning populism is complicated as it is difficult to define it it-
self. It often happens that the allegation of populism is already inherently “populist” 
because it is based on demagogic arguments. Populism critics often use the projec-
tion mechanism to exaggerate the populist tendencies of their political competi-
tors1. On the other hand, populist or extreme-populist tendencies are noticeable in 
many parts of the world, also in countries with centuries-old democratic traditions, 
because within the economic and financial order many social strata feel excluded 
from any real influence on politics and the system of power, and participation in 
real welfare is not based on the principle of social justice2. In the era of globaliza-
tion and migration, as well as the noticeable division of the world into a rich and 
a poor part, and colonial-era implications that are embedded in postcolonial struc-
tures, people in many parts of the world, especially in rich countries, feel anxiety or 
even fear of being different, which may encourage populism and nationalism which 
have nothing to do with patriotism. This is accompanied by technocratic efforts 
involving power exercising instead of actual governing, handing over of power to 
commission entities both on a global and European scale, and not to political bodies 
with a proper election mandate3. The extraordinary situation with the wave of mi-
grants, including refugees, affected Germany where Christian Churches, despite 
the decreasing number of believers who left the Church as a result of apostasy, play 
an opinion-forming role in the structure of German society in the context of intra-
church and social debate. These Churches remain in permanent dialogue, seeking 
a common solution to current events, social and cultural tendences and historical 
contexts. A very important joint text of Deutsche Bischofskonferenz (hereinafter 
referred to as DBK) and Rat der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), 
published in 2019, is a document which, while assessing the democratic system in 
a comprehensive way, aims to strengthen social belief concerning its values which 
result from its proper perception and practical implementation4. Also, pastoral aids 
1 Ralf Dahrendorf. 2019. Acht Anmerkungen zum Populismus/Eight remarks on populism. 
Potsdam-Babelsberg (et al): Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit, 6.
2 Grzegorz Chojnacki. 2019. “Etyka cnót w polityce. Idea społeczeństwa sprawiedliwego 
w dialogu ekumenicznym Kościołów chrześcijańskich w Niemczech”. Studia Oecumenica 19: 
268–269.
3 More about governance methods in a globalized world cf. Wawrzyniec Rudolf. 2010. “Kon-
cepcja governance i jej zastosowanie – od instytucji międzynarodowych do niższych szczebli wła-
dzy”. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica 245: 73–82.
4 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, Rat der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. 2019. Vertrauen 
in die Demokratie stärken (Gemeinsame Texte 26). Bonn – Hannover (hereinafter referred to as: 
VDS and page number)
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prepared by DBK, evaluating extreme right-wing populist tendences and indicating 
pragmatic solution opposing to waves of extreme beliefs should be also mentioned 
in the context of the said joint document5. Wojciech Roszkowski notes that since 
2004 in Germany the public attraction was won by “the extreme post-communist 
left which can be as aggressive as the extreme nationalist right”6. Therefore, each 
voice of Christian Church representatives referring to current social situation seems 
to be something understandable and necessary. This paper aims to present the re-
ception of a mental state of German society by Christian communities’ represent-
atives, aetiology of any types of populist behaviour and ways of activating civil 
society as part of awakening axiological and moral awareness that will follow the 
ideas of a democratic state, and not extreme ideologies.
1. Explication of the origin and nature of populist tendences
While taking into account that populist tendences develop in Germany in a sinu-
soid way, both hierarchs of German Christian Churches aim to approach this phe-
nomenon in a reliable way in their search for its aetiology. For its condemnation or 
showing that the solutions proposed by populism supporters are simply unwise and 
do not eliminate the problem7. While developing this idea, it should be emphasized 
that the belief adopted by the politicians that their political decisions are inherently 
right and supporting it by the feeling that they implement the will of the nation, 
their voters or society requires more detail, because referring to the sovereign’s will 
does not mean uncritically accepting any detailed solutions. Therefore, vigilance 
of intellectual elites, moral authorities and a feeling of common sense in all citizens 
are required. It is certainly counterproductive to express a grudge or regret towards 
voters who favour populist parties. It is rather necessary that all responsible social 
forces, including the Christian Churches, have answered the question of whether 
they have done their best to understand the needs of a changing society, while tak-
ing into account all social groups8.
5 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz. 2019. Dem Populismus widerstehen. Arbeitshilfe zum kirchli-
chen Umgang mit rechtspopulistischen Tendenzen (Arbeitshilfen Nr. 305). Bonn (hereinafter refer-
red to as: PW and page number).
6 Wojciech Roszkowski. 2019. Roztrzaskane lustro. Upadek cywilizacji zachodniej. Kraków: 
Biały Kruk, 548.
7 VDS, 6: “So sehr diese Vorgehensweise mit ihren einfachen Lösungen zu problematisieren 
ist, so sehr muss sie auch als ein Anzeichen gesehen werden, unsere demokratische Ordnung ange-
sichts der gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen weiterzuentwickeln“.
8 VDS, 14: “Obwohl ein einheitlicher Volkswille eine gefährliche Fiktion ist und der Populis-
mus auf keines der Probleme unserer Zeit eine tragfähige Antwort hat, verfangen seine Parolen 
dennoch bei vielen Menschen und finden bei demokratischen Wahlen Zustimmung. Wer die Demo-
kratie ernst nimmt, kann darauf nicht bloß mit Empörung oder gar Wählerbeschimpfung reagieren, 
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When we consider the term “populus”, it primarily means “people, nation” 
and has positive connotations. Therefore, the word “populism” may seem a posi-
tive expression at first glance. However, the danger we face is that the notion 
of “nation” is not understood by populists in a complementary manner. A nation 
is neither ethnically monolithic nor people that stand in opposition to any groups 
or institutions. A nation understood in this way may lead to the development 
of leftist populism, which emphasizes antagonistic processes, institutions and 
groups in relation to the people (nation). Globalization, Americanization, capital-
ists, international corporations and unions, groups of rich countries stand in op-
position to the left-winged people. On the other hand, right-wing populist groups 
are marked with the determination of national identity (both cultural and ethnic) 
in relation to other nations, immigrants or national minorities9.
In Europe, right-wing populism can also be characterized by Euroscepticism, 
which has a cultural aetiology (e.g. the EU is treated as a threat to language, val-
ues), political genesis (e.g. the state should be autonomous and sovereign) or 
economic reasons (e.g. the EU is considered to be a threat of the use of national 
economies). Also, it should also be emphasized that all populist groups and par-
ties, both right- and left-wing, use democratic mechanisms to be represented 
within the legislative forum. And although populism in its essence is anti-par-
liamentary, it is a parliamentary election that is used to participate in power. The 
diagnosis of many political scientists shows that the victories of populist parties 
and associations in elections often indicate the weakness of the previous parlia-
ment and the lack of representativeness of all social strata10. At the same time, as 
emphasized by the German hierarchs of both Churches, democracy nevertheless 
provides the best grounds and conditions to face all the challenges of today, but 
democracy must owe its credibility to credible politicians11.
Perhaps the most important threat to democracy by populism is the intro-
duction of an element of anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism. As noted by M. 
Marczewska-Rytko, populists want, in the name of noble principles of brother-
hood and social solidarity, to lead to the creation of an ex-, not inclusive, com-
munity, headed by people who will awaken the “dormant” forces of the people. 
This peculiar idealization of the people leads to its antagonistic understanding 
in comparison to the elites, which are perceived as “alienated” from real social 
sondern muss sich selbstkritisch die Frage stellen, ob die etablierten politischen und gesellschaft-
lichen Kräfte – auch wir Kirchen – vielleicht zu wenig getan haben, um die mit den verschiedenen 
Herausforderungen verbundenen Fragen und Interessen der Menschen aufzugreifen und mit ihnen 
über Lösungsmöglichkeiten ins Gespräch zu kommen”.
9 Cf. Jan Pakulski. 2016. “Ruchy populistyczne i degeneracja elit przywódczych – analiza we-
berowska”. Zoon politikon 7: 59.
10 Dahrendorf. 2019. Acht Anmerkungen zum Populismus/Eight remarks on populism, 9.
11 Cf. VDS, 16.
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problems. Thus, they have nothing to do with the people’s values. Proponents 
of populist tendencies in society often promote their conflict in the context of val-
ues, setting themselves as a model for their implementation, while the elites, in 
their opinion, follow values that do not meet the basic needs of the people. This 
anti-elitism is very often related to anti-intellectualism, which consists in ques-
tioning the value of theoretical and practical reason as an instance that devel-
ops ideas and provides practical solutions for their implementation. The natural 
search for knowledge, for which reason is responsible, wants to exchange forces 
such as feelings, belonging to the volitional order in man. Reason allows a person 
to make specific decisions under the influence of willpower, which takes into ac-
count the person’s entire system of emotions and feelings. However, it cannot be 
replaced by feelings12.
Apart from anti-elitist and anti-intellectual tendencies, populism support-
ers adhere to very interesting economic views that may arouse great popularity 
among part of the society. Populists point to the possibility of building an eco-
nomic order on the so-called “Third Way”, which means an intermediate solution 
between the capitalist and communist systems for them. In the name of economic 
syncretism, they can combine the best solutions offered by socialism supporters 
with capitalist ideas. Among these syncretic solutions, the need to maintain a pro-
tective role of the state towards state-owned enterprises is primarily recognized. 
This role may be multidimensional, including state subsidies that may distort 
the free market and the principle of competition. Often, in populism, fighting 
against world’s globalist tendencies, the state is required to assume a role of the 
society defender against domestic and international monopolies, which may act 
unfavourably or even take advantage of the people. M. Marczewska-Rytko em-
phasizes, like many economists, that populism prefers to favour inflation poli-
cy. This means a tendency to increase the budget deficit, put more money into 
circulation claiming that this will be a kind of remedy for economic problems. 
All in all, it may be concluded that from the economic point of view, populism 
tries to balance between stagnation and development attempts13. A very interest-
ing aspect of assessing populist tendencies is their understanding of the relation-
ship between an individual and social groups which are subject to multiplication, 
transformation or collapse. Supporters of populism see a huge potential in their 
ideas, which aim to help an individual, and thus a whole society, come out of the 
state of axiological emptiness and anomie, to rebuild individual’s moral features 
and make legal order objective but also interiorized by man. Undoubtedly, in the 
12 Cf. Maria Marczewska-Rytko. 2000. Populizm. In Encyklopedia politologii. Vol. 4. Ed. Ma-
ria Marczewska-Rytko, Edward Olszewski, 290. Zakamycze: Kantor Wydawniczy Zakamycze.
13 Cf. Marczewska-Rytko. 2000. Populizm, 291.
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times of the cultural disintegration, the emergence of subcultural groups, the de-
velopment of nationalist or anti-globalist sentiments as well as a sense of a wide-
spread chaos, populist tendencies find easy ground for growth14. In this context, 
questions arise about the condition of modern democracy in individual countries 
where legal systems are based on it. In a situation of strengthening nationalist-
populist tendencies, democracy seems to be failing, although its ideas should, on 
the whole, foster the development of national values, as noted by M. Kuniński. 
Democracy, as a rule, respects and promotes the principle of freedom of speech. 
It also observes the rights of national and ethnic minorities, ensuring an integral 
development of all individuals belonging to a given state community and the op-
portunity to associate in order to be represented in all political and decision-
making bodies. However, the question of the balance between understanding the 
nation in the political and cultural sense remains open. Undoubtedly, the cultural 
respect for the rights of individual national and ethnic entities fosters harmoni-
ous development of the social order, however, it must be combined with political 
forms ensuring political integrity and building a civil society on the bonds of real 
participation in public life. Without these appropriate forms, populism may arise, 
taking the form of national separatism15.
While contemplating the background of the multidimensional nature of popu-
list tendencies, it is interesting to describe the attitude of the hierarchs of both 
Christian churches in Germany and their diagnoses concerning the global con-
text, especially in the context of the actual and real life problems experienced by 
individual German citizens, but also fuelling irrational fears16.
2. Socio-political and cultural tendencies in German society in axiological 
and moral assessment
In view of the intensification of dissatisfaction, disorientation and fuelling 
populist tendencies in the German society, the Catholic and Evangelical churches 
see the need to strengthen the values of democracy and its perception among the 
citizens, especially their faithful. A united voice, expressed in the form of a docu-
14 Cf. Marczewska-Rytko. 2000. Populizm, 291–292.
15 Cf. Miłowit Kuniński. 2004. Demokracja. In Słownik społeczny. Ed. Bogdan Szlachta, 127. 
Kraków: WAM.
16 Cf. an accurate analysis of the causes of irrational thinking of individuals in a given society: 
Sabina Olszyk. 2007. “Vox populi vox Dei. Teoria populizmu politycznego”. Annales Academiae 
Paedagogicae Cracoviensis 46: 238. “Zasadniczym elementem retoryki populistycznej jest negacja, 
czyli opozycyjność wobec istniejącego stanu rzeczy, mobilizowanie uboższych warstw społecz-
nych przeciw instytucjom państwa. Ruchy populistyczne podsycając mniej lub bardziej irracjo-
nalne lęki, stają się gwarancją bezpiecznego przejścia przez momenty kryzysowe i lansują się jako 
jedyny skuteczny sposób na zaspokojenie potrzeb mas”.
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ment, confirms that the Christian Churches want to play their meta-political role 
towards the society and the German state, and treat their subsidiary function as 
a service to the truth and purification of human conscience, thus safeguarding the 
democratic and legal order based on universal values, negatively evaluating all 
extreme ways of thinking and attitudes. This democratic order is possible only 
if the rule of law foundations comprise freedom and equality. As emphasized by 
the Churches’ representatives, there is no single model of a democratic system, 
therefore, a democratic constitutional state, a democratic state of law, a liberal 
or constitutional democracy is being discussed here, however, it is hard to im-
agine a lack of reflexive relation between freedom and law in democracy. The 
nation, as a sovereign and collective subject of freedom, never stands above the 
law, but rules itself within the framework of the law it has established. When 
dignity and each individual’s rights resulting from dignity are constitutively en-
shrined in the law established by man, then the idea of free and equal people is 
accomplished, which is extremely important for all democratic processes as it 
provides them with a proper framework17. According to A. Sylwestrzak, the rule 
of law should be based “on a socially approved organizational structure, on the 
one hand, and on clearly exposed catalogue of axiological values on the other, 
where democratic principles of electoral law, the separation of power, respect for 
human rights as well as guarantee of independence of courts and public control 
underline the legal system”18. Apart from a close relationship between freedom 
and law, which must never be destroyed, the hierarchs provide that “democratic 
morality” is of great importance from an ethical point of view, which they de-
fine not as a vision of a good life combined with individual development, but 
as the implementation of good manners in democracy that will have an impact 
on the quality of politics. Among many good manners, they emphasized the at-
titude of “fairness” in all activities aimed at better political ratings, showing re-
spect to other political competitors, the ability to conduct polemics and political 
discourse, which should have specific practical implications, instead of acting 
a political “theatre”. In addition, democratic morality must take into account the 
sense for community and striving for the common good. These activities can 
contribute to a better political culture that has a great influence on the behaviour 
and relationships between members of a given community19.
Along with emphasizing the principles of democratic morality, it is difficult 
not to notice the importance and significance of social justice, which, when 
17 Cf. VDS, 24; PW, 31.




implemented in social life, is a guarantee of maintaining the social balance, so 
crucial in the intensification of populist tendencies. VDS warns that the experi-
ence of fallen democracies show that social balance and focus towards social 
justice seems to be essential in building a country’s democratic stability. The 
weakness of democracy can be seen in the example of tax avoidance by new 
markets that seek the so-called tax havens and, while failing to comply with 
the rules of good cooperation and prosecution of financial crimes, they look for 
illicit privileges.
A very serious reason for the development of populist tendencies is the un-
precedented gap between rich and poor people on a micro- and macro-world 
scale, which increases the sense of social injustice and affects community soli-
darity, especially when the rich relieve themselves of the obligation to support 
the common good, which is one from the more serious factors destabilizing the 
democratic system. Christian Churches representatives also emphasize the need 
to ensure access to basic goods such as education, health care and safety in an 
open and transparent manner for everyone and the need for sufficient funding, 
in the spirit of ensuring social justice. If access under the given conditions is not 
ensured, this raises the problem of excluding certain social groups not only in 
a social but also political sense, which is naturally a “fuel” for people spreading 
populist ideas. Therefore, it is not enough to promote liberal ideas or respect the 
rule of law to ensure a democratic order, but it is necessary to appreciate the so-
cial dimension of democracy as a normative goal, which is undoubtedly the main 
pillar of the political order built on freedom, law and democratic morality20. As 
noted by political scientists, it was Aristotle who distinguished between institu-
tional and moral justice. When the legislator passes a law, it is based on a specific 
concept of morality. Therefore, the idea of Aristotle raises the fundamental ques-
tion whether the legislator is able to achieve synergy between the concept of law 
and the moral convictions of the citizen. His advice is to seek legal solutions to 
minimize the discrepancies that had already been visible in his time, and which 
are still visible while assessing contemporary pluralist societies. “However, the 
emergence of clear and extremely opposite attitudes results in the deepening 
of the problem of the alienation of power derived from the philosophy of Feu-
erbach, Hegel or Marx […]”21, which is a common problem for both “young” 
and “old” democracies. By commenting the issue of educational exclusion and 
inequality, M.V. Llosa emphasizes the problem of privilege and defines it as fa-
vouritism: “It is indeed in the world of education – school, vocational and uni-
versity – that privilege is most unfair, whereby some young people are privileged 
20 VDS, 26-27, cf. PW, 22.
21 Sylwestrzak. 2015. Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych, 421.
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to receive high quality education while other ones are condemned with cursory 
and ineffective education leading to reduction of future opportunities, failure or 
existence limited to survival”22. Probably in the case of education, the Christian 
Churches in Germany still have resources that would allow more effective access 
to good forms of education.
In the era of globalization, German hierarchs see the need to build a Europe 
of solidarity and peace based on its historical heritage, in which three pillars 
are noted: ancient philosophy, Roman legislation and Judeo-Christian reli-
gious roots. To ensure a lasting peace in Europe, it is necessary to take into 
account the balance between what is universal and European and what is char-
acteristic for each of the European nations. Going to cosmopolitan or purely 
national extremes, imposing majoritarian solutions disregarding the character 
and distinctiveness of a given country or remaining convinced of the rightness 
of one’s own national legal and economic scheme are counter-effective actions, 
while searching for balance and compromise fosters the development of soli-
darity in Europe23. The German hierarchs warn against conducting a political 
and social discourse from a narrow German perspective and overly supporting 
national interests only (such as Nord Stream 2)24. On the other hand, when the 
progression of the political system in the EU shows an increase in legislative 
and executive powers at the central level, the powers of representative instances 
of individual states may be limited, which naturally leads to the development 
of populist tendencies in given national communities against the background 
of citizens’ passivity and strengthening of bodies of representative offices in the 
EU that are not elected but appointed. The processes of strengthening of the 
oligarchic tendencies among the EU ruling institutions are also noticeable, as 
a result of the fact that the entire EU community is many times larger in number 
but also more divided in terms of political and economic interests. Therefore, 
finally there are situations in which, at the level of the civil society of a given 
Member State, there is a reduction in the political responsibility of the rulers and 
the reduction of citizens’ control over the governing bodies25. Faced with such 
trends, it is necessary to emphasize the necessity of participation as a credible 
feature of a “good governance” doctrine, which can be an effective antidote to 
the previously demonstrated weaknesses of the common Europe: “The quality, 
relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring broad participa-
tion throughout the policy chain – from the first idea to the end result. Such par-
22 Mario Vargas Llosa. 2020. Zew plemienia. Transl. Marzena Chrobak. Kraków: Znak, 24.
23 VDS, 31.
24 VDS, 30.
25 Cf. Kuniński. 2004. Demokracja, 126–127.
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ticipation largely depends on national governments, which, after all, co-create 
and then implement EU policies in their countries”26. A very pressing problem 
of modern democracies in developed countries is the issue of digitization, which 
is ambiguously perceived by the German Churches’ representatives as an op-
portunity and a threat. Digitization should be treated as something positive, as 
a tool for participation in the progress of civilization, the increase of the popu-
lation’s wealth as well as the development of the common good. This is only 
possible when all digital means and tools as well as both knowledge and ability 
to use them are widely available. Naturally, participation in democratic system 
is currently unthinkable without digital technologies. The state, according to the 
hierarchs of the Churches, is primarily responsible for creating the conditions 
and framework for the proper development of digital infrastructure that includes 
the country’s entire territory. It is necessary when private investors leave some 
of the country’s areas, especially rural ones, without proper digital infrastruc-
ture, due to some commercial reasons. This call is even more understandable 
in the era of the coronavirus pandemic and the threatening state of lockdown. 
The protection of data, both regarding individuals and all state structures seems 
to be even greater challenge and a “sign of the times” in the era of such rapid 
technological development. Each country’s public authorities should treat such 
protection as major political task influencing all structural and functional activi-
ties of all services on each levels of both the state and community. Apart from 
well working protective systems, it is necessary to make aware each citizen and 
implement the data protection within the available personal protective means 
and individual vigilance aiming to increase protective standards against politi-
cal manipulation. The Christian Churches’ representatives also emphasize the 
need for joint political action on a global scale upon the emergence of larger and 
larger digital giants covering more and more areas of the Earth, and their pos-
session of more and more data that can be used as a huge political and economic 
power and illegal trade of IT resources27.
While discussing digital processes, VDS highlights three ethical tasks for 
the world of media, which has actually become the so-called “fourth” author-
ity in the era of digitization, responsible for the democratic order. Among all, 
they are bound to act in a diligent way in the event of spreading and using 
fake news to maintain the principle of the highest transparency of informa-
tion. Apart from this diligence, faced with attempts to exaggerate and evaluate 
political facts that a crucial for democratic decisions it is necessary to maintain 
critical reflection. In third place, special attention should be paid to the very 
26 Rudolf. 2010. “Koncepcja governance i jej zastosowanie”, 79.
27 VDS, 40–41.
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ambivalent potential of social media. These three tasks pose a great challenge 
to democratic morality, where media ethics is one of the milestones of build-
ing a just civil society28.
Conclusion
“Unity in diversity” comprises both a goal and a process in ecumenical dia-
logue. While uttering a joint voice on the democratic order in their country, the 
representatives of both Christian Churches in Germany are striving to fulfil their 
metapolitical role in designing a civil society and setting high standards and good 
practices in politics. Only the combination of axiology and the political and le-
gal system can ensure the growth of the common good, which translates into 
the socio-economic development of individual citizens and their involvement in 
building a civil society.
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